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ABSTRACT 
This paper shows the importance of explicitly accounting  for the 
possibility  of recalls when  analyzing  the determinants  of 
unemployment  spell durations and the effects of unemployment 
insurance  (UI)  on unemployment outcomes  in the United  States.  These 
issues are examined  using a unique sample of UI recipients  from 
Missouri  and Pennsylvania  covering unemployment  spells in the  1979— 
1981 period.  We find that those expectjn recall who are n 
recalled tend to have quite long unemployment  spells.  Furthermore, 
ex-ante temporary  layoff spells  (the spells of individuals'  who 
initially expect to be recalled)  may account  for over 60 percent of 
the unemployment  of UI recipients  and appear to account  for much more 
unemployment  than ex-post temporary  layoff spells (spells actually 
ending  in recall).  We estimate  a competing  risks model  in which  the 
finding of a new job and recall are treated as alternate  routes of 
leaving unemployment.  Our results using this approach  show that  the 
recall and new job exit probabilities  have quite different  time 
patterns  and are often affected  in opposite ways by explanatory 
variables.  We also  find that the probability of leaving unemployment 
(both through recalls and new job finding) increases  greatly around 
the time that UI benefits  lapse. 
Lawrence  Katz  Bruce Meyer 
Department  of Economics  Department of Economics 
Harvard University  Northwestern  University 
Cambridge,  MA  02138  Evanston,  Illinois  60208 Temporary  layoffs, where workers are laid of  f when  demand 
declines  and often rehired by their  original employers,  are an 
important  feature of the U.S. labor market.  Feldstein  (1975) and 
Lilien  (1980) conclude  from examinations of establishment  data on 
turnover  that over seventy percent of workers laid of  f in U.S. 
manufacturing  in the 1970's were subsequently rehired by their former 
employers.  The layoff—rehire process also appears to be widespread 
outside of manufacturing.  Data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics  for 1980 and 1981 indicate that about fifty percent of heads 
of households  laid off from nonmanufacturing  jobs have unemployment 
spells ending in recall.1  Not only do many unemployment spells end 
in recall, but a large fraction of the total weeks of unemployment 
accumulated by some labor force groups  (e.g.  unemployment insurance 
recipients, manufacturing workers,  and prime—age males) occur in 
temporary  layoff spells.  For example,  Feldstein finds that forty 
percent of all weeks of unemployment for men age 45—59 in the 1966—71 
period were accumulated by individuals who did not change employers,2 
This paper shows the importance of explicitly accounting  for the 
possibility  of recalls when analyzing the composition  of 
unemployment,  the determinants of unemployment spell durations, and 
the effects of unemployment  insurance  (UI)  on unemployment outcomes 
in the United States.  These issues are examined using a unique 
1This data set is described and analyzed  in Katz  (1986). 
2Temporary layoffs are also a substantial component  of 
unemployment  in Canada.  Robertson  (1988) finds for Canada in 1984 
that approximately  35 percent of total weeks of unemployment were 
accounted  for by persons who eventually returned to their former 
employers. 2 
sample of UI recipients from Missouri and  Pennsylvania covering 
unemployment spells in the 1979—1981 period.  This data set oombinas 
continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) UI administrative  records 
with information from a  follow-up survey  conducted approximately  one 
year after individuals  filed for UI benefita  The  CWHH questions, 
which ware asked at the time  an individual filed for UI,  include 
whether  or not each person expected to be reca11ed  The follow—up 
aurvay determined whether each  unemployment apell  ended  in recall, 
ended In the fInding of a  new job. or yes  censored at the  survey 
date.  This  informatioo  allows  us to determine the relationship 
between reoall axpeotations and  unemployment experience  for  UI 
recipients in the two states. 
The first focus of our empirical work is on the composition of 
unemployment of UI recipients.  In particular, we attempt to 
determine the fraction of unemployment spells and fraction  of time 
spent unemployed  accounted for by the layoff-recall process.  Most 
previous  research has concluded that temporary layoffs account for 
large fraction of unemployment  spells, but a much smaller fraction of 
total time spent unemployed.3  Two distinct measures of temporary 
layoffs have been used to determine the fraction of total 
3see  Feldstein  (1975) and Lilien  (l98O)  On the other hand, 
clark and Summers  (1979)  argue that temporary layoffs do not account 
for a large share of total unemployment in the United  States.  The 
difference  in the conclusions appears to come from the emphasis  of 
the first papers on joblosers, manufacturing  employees, and prime- 
age males, all of whom (like  UI recipients) are more likely to be 
involved in temporary  layoffs.  Murphy and Topel  (1987) present 
evidence  for 1968 to 1985 on the fraction of ongoing unemployment 
spells in the Current Population Survey that are classified  as 
temporary layoffs. 3 
unemployment  time accounted  for by the layoff—recall process.  The 
first captures the proportion of unemployment from spells involving 
no job change, while the second looks at the  fraction of the 
unemployed at a point in time who expect to be recalled.  These 
measures  are likely to underestimate  the total amount of unemployment 
affected by recall prospects.  The first measure does not include the 
unemployment of those who waited for recall but were not eventually 
recalled.  The second measure only partially  includes people who 
expect to be recalled, since recall expectations are likely to fade 
as an unemployment  spell continues.  We provide evidence that those 
jjg  recall who are  recalled tend to have quite long 
unemployment spells.  Furthermore, ex—ante temporary  layoff spells 
(the spells of individuals' who initially expect to be recalled) may 
account for much more unemployment than ex—post temporary layoff 
spells  (those actually ending in recall). 
The second part of our empirical work  shows the value of 
explicitly  treating the possibility of recall when analyzing 
unemployment spell durations.  Models that allow recalls naturally 
lead to a competing  risks specification  of the duration  of 
unemployment spell in which the finding of a new job and recall are 
alternate  routes of leaving unemployment  (Katz, 1986). This 
specification differs from the single risk approach  typically used in 
most studies of unemployment spell durations.  Our findings using the 
competing risks approach shows that the recall and new job exit 
probabilities  have quite different patterns  and are often affected  in 
opposite ways by explanatory variables.  We also find that the probability of leaving unemployment  (both through recalls and new jcb 
finding) increases greatly around the time that UI benefits  lapse. 
The reoainder of the paper is organized as follows%  Section  I 
discuases several  theoretical models  of the recall process  and the 
impact of the potential duration of  unemployment benefits  on 
unemployment outcomes.  These models both guide the empirical  work 
and aid the interpretation  of the results.  Section II describes  the 
MiasouriPennaylvania  unemployment  insurance recipients data set. 
Section III analyzes the compoaition of unemployment,  the search 
behavior  of the unemployed,  the distribution of unemployment  spell 
durations,  and pcstunemployment  wages using the Missouri— 
Pennsylvsnia data set.  Section IV uses econometric duration  models 
to empirically determine the  impact of recall expectations, 
demographic  characteristics, and UI variables on unemployment  spell 
durations  and the likelihood of a spell ending in recall.  Section V 
concludes 
I. Theoretical Backeround 
Ell  Pros acts an  Unem lpent S all Durat  ions 
The duration  of unemployment is typically analyzed using a 
standard job search model in which unemployed workers generate  job 
offers by costly search. This approach  leads to a  single risk model 
of unemployment spell durations in which unemployment spells can only 
end through the finding of an acceptable new job. This formulation  is 
less appropriate when analyzing the unemployment durations  of workers 5 
on layoff  with some possibility of recall. The prospect  of recall 
affects the probability of leaving unemployment directly  through the 
rate of actual recalls and indirectly by affecting worker search 
behavior. Katz  (1986) extends the standard McCall  (1970) model of job 
search to include an exogenous probability of recall.4  Katz finds 
that under reasonable conditions better recall prospects  reduce the 
new job finding rate by raising the reservation wage and reducing the 
likelihood of search.  This suggests that workers who expect to be 
recalled may have extremely lpng unemployment spells if their 
expectations are not  fulfilled. 
Katz  (1985)  also analyzes a model in which unemployed workers 
learn about their recall prospects in a Bayesian manner.  He shows 
that the longer a worker is unemployed, all else held  constant,  the 
lower will be his or her subjective probability  of recall.  This 
result leads to a decreasing reservation wage and possibly  increasing 
search intensity.  Consequently,  the new job finding rate for those 
who initially expect to be recalled should rise with  unemployment 
duration  (display positive duration dependence) under  this scenario. 
Furthermore, the statistical model of unemployment spell 
durations generated  by the job search models extended to allow for 
recalls is a competing risks model in which unemployment  spells can 
end either through recall or the finding of an acceptable new job.5 
The predictions of standard job search models  for how variables 
4Burdett  and Mortensen  (1978)  and Pissarides  (1982)  also analyze 
job search models that incorporate the possibility of recalls. 
5  See Kalbfleisch and Prentice  (1980)  for a detailed  discussion 
of competing  risks models. 6 
affect the escape rate from unemployment really refer to the new job 
finding rate and these predictions need not hold for the overall 
escape rate from unemployment  (the aunt  of the recall and new job 
finding rates)  .  Information on whether spells ended through reoall 
or the finding of a mew job allows an econometrician  to estimate a 
competing risks model,  The competing risks specification has the 
advantage of permitting one to identify the distinct  impact of 
variables on  the recall rate and  the  new  job finding rates, 
ThLQLt2QLhL±btnqffls  and 
The impact of finite duration UI  on worker  job  search and 
ecplnyer recall behavior  has  been analyzed in several ways. 
Mortansen (1977)  utilizes a  standard  dynamic  search model  with  no 
recall possibility, a stationary known wage offer distribution,  and a 
constant rate of job offers.  As the remaining number of weeks of 
benefits  decreases,  the value of remaining  unemployed  also decreases. 
This drop causes search intensity to rise and  the resenatiom wage  to 
fall  as an individual gets closer to when benefits  lapse.  These 
changes in behavior  imply that the hazard rate  (or escape rate) from 
unemployment rises till the date of benefits  exhaustion and stays 
constant after the exhaustion  date.  On  the other hand, if 
individuals  can  locate jobs and arrange mot to begin work until their 
benefits  run out, one could find a discrete  increase in the escape 
rate near the point of benefits  exhaustion. 
An alternative approach  is taken by Moffitt and Nicholson  (1982) 
who use a static model where unemployed workers have preferences over 7 
income and unemployment.  Some unemployment is valued  because of its 
leisure component  and because one can search while unemployed.  At 
the tine of job loss, individuals choose income and weeks  of 
unemployment subject to a budget constraint.  The budget constraint 
has a convex kink at the week of UI exhaustion because unemployment 
ceases to be subsidized.  This kink implies that there may be a 
bunching of unemployment spell durations around the time benefits 
lapse. 
Mortensen  (1987)  analyzes a joint wealth maximizing model of job 
separations with transitory demand changes facing firms and limited 
duration  of unemployment benefits.  The discrete  change in the  flow 
value of being unemployed when benefits are exhausted yields the 
prediction that many firms may recall laid-off workers around the 
benefit exhaustion point. 
The theoretical models of unemployment spell durations surveyed 
indicate the importance of explicitly taking into account the recall 
process and the limited duration of unemployment benefits when 
analyzing the unemployment spells of UI recipients. 
II.  Data Description: The Missouri—Pennsylvania  UI Recipients  Sample 
We use a unique data set to determine the fraction of 
unemployment of UI recipients due to ex-ante and ex—post  layoffs and 
the relation of recall expectations to worker job search behavior. 
The data set consists of a sample of unemployment  insurance 
recipients from Missouri  and Pennsylvania beginning  their 
unemployment  insurance benefit years during the period October  1979 8 
to March igso.6  The data set ccmbines records collected  by the 
Unemployment Insurance Service under the Continuous Wage and Benefit 
History (CWBH) system with ipformation from special supplemental 
telephone interviews ccnducted in late 1980 and early  1981.  The CWBH 
data include recall expectations,  pre—Ul weekly  income, and 
demographic veriebles  obtained  from a survey administered when 
individuals tiled for UI.  Also included are edministrative  records 
on wsekly UI benefits,  the number of weeks of benefits  for which  en 
individual was  eligible,  end the  timing  end  number of  weeks 
collected.  The follow-up  telephone  interviews ask when  a  job was 
found,  the  weekly  wsges  on  the job,  whether the job was with  the 
pre-Ul  employer, end edditional information.  The construction  of 
original data set is described by Corson and Nicholson  (1983) 
The major advantage of this deta set is that it provides 
information on whether  individuals expected  to be recalled at the 
time they filed for UI benefits, on how their initial unemployment 
spells ended, end on the level end length of unemployment  insurance 
benefits available to each individual. Most previous work has used 
either CWBH data or survey date in isolation. Studies using only CW8H 
data  (e.g.  Moffitt,  1985; Meyer, 1988) miss the period  prior to 
61n other words, the individuals in the sample all  filed for 
unemployment insurance benefits during the October  1979 to March 1980 
period. The initial unemployment spells for almost all of these 
individuals began during this time interval. The rare exceptions  are 
those individuals with unemployment spells that began before October 
1,  1979, but who did not file an unemployment insurance claim  until 
after October  1,  1979, 
7corson and Hilton  (1982)  provide detailed documentation  of the 
version of the data set we utilized to extract our sample. filing for UI, the uncensored  length of spells for those who exhaust 
benefits, and whether spells end through recall or the finding of a 
new job. Studies using micro survey data sets such as the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics or National  Longitudinal Survey  (e.g.  Dynarski and 
Sheffrin,  1987.  Katz, 1986) tend to have poor information on the UI 
system parameters  facing unemployed individuals and may have  greater 
measurement error because of the retrospective nature of many of the 
questions.  One disadvantage of the data set that we use is that it 
contains  individuals from only two states over a short time period so 
that there is not a great deal of variation  in the UI system 
parameters.  A second disadvantage is that the data set does not 
allow us to examine the unemployment experiences of those who do not 
receive UI.  This is an important issue because a large and 
increasing fraction of the unemployed in the U.S. are not UI 
recipients 
The original Missouri-Pennsylvania  telephone interview data set 
contains 2035 observations.  Exclusions for missing demographic  data 
end incomplete or inconsistent information on unemployment  spells 
leaves a sample of 1499 observations.9  Variable  definitions and 
8Burtless  (1983),  Murphy and Topel  (1987), and Kane  (1988) 
document the decline in the fraction of the unemployed  receiving UI 
in the U.S. and examine alternative explanations  for this phenomenon. 
9observations were deleted for missing information on age, sex, 
marital status, education, the weekly UI benefit level, recall 
expectations,  and on whether a definite recall date was given. 
Individuals who filed a UI claim but were disqualified before 
receiving benefits were deleted. 41 individuals in Missouri who 
received no weeks of full UI and apparently received partial UI while 
working part-time were also deleted. Finally, those individuals with 
missing UI claim dates, missing start dates of their initial 10 
basic descriptive statistics for this sample are  given  in Table 1. 
We  focus most  of our analysis  on  the initial spell of 
unemployment  in the benefit year for  each  individual in the  sample. 
Since  the data  set consists of a sampling of workers beginning 
unemployment  insurance spells within a  reasonably  short interval in 
each state, the  sample provides  an approximation to a  random sample 
drawn  from the  inflow  of UI recipients into unemployment.10  For  an 
economy  in  a  steady  state, the distribution of first spells of 
unemployment  of entrants  into unemployment is the  same as the 
distribution of the  completed spells of  a  orosssection  of the 
unemployed.  This provides some justification  for analyzing the 
characteristics of initial unemployment spellsJ  Our further 
justification  is that the data set provides much better informstion 
on first spells then on total unemployment in the benefit year  for 
unemployment spell, or irreconcilable inconsistencies  among their 
claim dates, spell start dates, and spell end dates were deleted. 
10Wbila the entire sampling frame covers UI spells beginning 
from October 1979 to March 1980,  the vast majority  (95 percent) of 
the individuals from Missouri have benefit year begin dates  in from 
November  1979 to Jenuary 1980 end the vast majority  (92 percent)  from 
Pennsylvania have benefit year begin dates from January to March  1980. 
0ne  problem with the data set is that the steady state 
assumption is likely to be violated,  First, since the sample 
includes  individuals with spells starting in the  fourth and first 
quarters, meny seasonally unemployed workers are likely to be 
included. This is especially likely in Pennsylvania since most of the 
sample has unemployment spells beginning  in the first quarter. The 
likely importance of seasonal unemployment means one must  be somewhat 
cautious in drawing inferences concerning  the distribution of 
unemployment  over the full year from this sample,  Second, fewer 
weeks of UI benefit eligibility, if any, are likely to be remaining 
for second or third unemployment spells in a benefit year.  Thus, the 
incentives during the first unemployment spells examined here are 
different  from those in a random sample of unemployment  spells of UI 
recipients. 11 
each individual. 
We have developed  several different measures of unemployment 
spell durations.  IUSR measures  the unemployment  spell starting  from 
the UI claim date which is available  from administrative  records,  and 
FSPELL measures  the spell from the respondent's self—reported  spell 
start date.  These two measures  can be computed  for both Pennsylvania 
and Missouri.  PAYSPELL  is an alternative measure that more fully 
utilizes  administrative records on the actual number of weeks of 
benefits  received, but  it can be computed only for individuals  from 
Missouri.12  All three unemployment spell measures  lead to similar 
conclusions concerning the fraction of unemployment due to either 
spells ending in recall or individuals who expected  recall.  The 
PAYSPELL measure provides  much more accurate  information for 
analyzing  the distribution of unemployment  spell durations. 
is defined as weeks from UI first payment date until 
reemployment  (or until the interview date if the first unemployment 
spell is still in progress at the interview date).  We utilized 
administrative  records rather than respondent retrospective 
information whenever possible  in constructing PAYSPELL.  CWBH 
administrative  information on the first payment date and on the weeks 
of benefits received  in the benefit year were only available  for 
Missouri.  For individuals who had a single compensated unemployment 
spell in the benefit year and who gained reemployment before benefits 
were exhausted, PAYSPELL can be computed from CWBM administrative 
records and equals the weeks of benefits  received in the benefit 
year.  Since the available CWBH data does not disaggregate  the total 
number of weeks of benefits  received  in a benefit year into 
individual spells of compensated unemployment,  we were forced to use 
respondent  retrospective  information on weeks of benefits  received 
for individuals with multiple  compensated unemployment  spells in the 
benefit year.  In this case, PAYSPELL equals the survey respondent's 
self—reported  weeks of benefits  received during his or her initial 
unemployment spell.  For individuals who exhausted their benefits 
during their initial unemployment  spell, PAYSPELL is given  by weeks 
from the UI first payment date  (from CWBH records) until the  self— 
reported  reemployment date  (or until the interview date if the spell 
is censored) 12 
The descriptive  statistics in Table 1 indicate that the prospect 
of recall was relevant  for a large majority of the UI recipients  in 
tha sample.  When asked soon after their unemployment  spells began, 
seventy—five percent expected to be recalled end eighteen percent had 
e definite  recall date  from their employerJ3  Fifty-seven percent of 
the individuals  in the sample had initial unemployment  spells ending 
in recell.  The mean  un  employment spell duretion  is about 15 veeks 
when measured from the  claim date  and about  16  weeks when  meesured 
14  rrom toe  end  ot  the pro-UI job. 
Unemployment insurance recipients  in Missouri  and  Pennsylvania 
largely  consisted of blue collar occupations  end workers previously 
employed in construction sod  meoufecturimg.  The importance of 
recells varied substantially across industries,  Sixty—six  percent of 
the workers laid—off from construction,  mining,  sod  manufacturing  hed 
spells ending in recall as opposed to thirty—seven percent of the 
workers from transportation, trade, services end administretioo. 
The  unemployment spell durations are substantially  longer on 
average for the Missouri  sample.  The mean spell length using IUSR is 
apprmximetely  17 weeks for Missouri and approximately  13 weeks  for 
Peonsylvenia.  The fraction of spells ending in recall is 64 percent 
13The recall expectations information arises from a claimant 
survey questionnaire  which clearly indicates that the  information is 
confidential and only for statistical mnd research purposes.  The 
information  is not utilized to determine claimant job search 
requirements or benefits eligibility. 
14These means are underestimates  of the true mean duration of 
completed  spells since only incomplete spell durations  are available 
for the 8 percent of the spells censored  at the interview date. 13 
in Pennsylvania and only 51 percent in Missouri. 
The rules concerning the level and duration of UI benefits  were 
much more  generous  in Pennsylvania than in Missouri  during the period 
of our sample.15 In particular, the maximum weekly  benefit available 
was $105 in Missouri  and $170 in Pennsylvania in 1980.  In fact, the 
mean weekly benefit amount of $125 for individuals  from Pennsylvania 
in our sample is greater than  the maximum possible benefit  in 
Missouri.  Pre-Ul earnings were similar in the two states leading to 
a much higher replacement rate in Pennsylvania.  Regular  UI benefits 
in Pennsylvania had a uniform duration of 30 weeks, while Missouri 
had a maximum potential duration of 26 weeks with variation  in the 
potential duration  that depended on base period and high  quarter 
earnings.  The Missouri sample provides  substantial variation  in the 
potential  length of benefits, while the Pennsylvania sample provides 
almost none.  Extended benefits were  triggered  in February  1980 in 
Pennsylvania  and in May 1980 in Missouri.  The extensions  raised the 
potential  length of benefits to 39 weeks in Pennsylvania and 
increased the potential length by fifty percent in Missouri. 
The extent to which firms' UI payroll taxes depended  on their 
previous  layoff rates also differed greatly in the two states.  A 
firm's future payroll taxes increased with layoffs until the  firm's 
unemployment rate reached 6.3 percent  in Missouri  as compared to 3.6 
percent in Pennsylvania.  On the other hand, Topel  (1985) calculates 
15Topel  (1985)  provides detailed  information on the 
characteristics  of the UI systems for Missouri, Pennsylvania  and 
several other states circa 1980. Corson and Nicholson  (1983) provide 
further information on the rules concerning the determination  of UI 
benefit levels and potential durations  in Missouri and Pennsylvania. 14 
that the marginal  affect of layoffs on future taxes was much greater 
in Pennsylvania than in Missouri when unemplolnnent  was below  the 
maximum. 
These UI system characteristics  indicate that firms in highly 
cyclical or seasonal  industries in Pennsylvania were  unlikely  to be 
experience-rated  on the margin end that the replacement rate was ouch 
higher in Pennsylvania.  These factors help explain why a larger 
fcsction of  UI  recipients in Pennsylvania were involved  in short 
layoff spells ending in recall to their original employer.  25 
percent of recipients in Pennsylvania had  definite recell dates  end 
64  percent were recalled,  The corresponding  figures for Missouri 
were 12 end 51 percent. 
flses 
The combination of administrative records and  survey data 
available  in the Missouri-Pennsylvania  date set provides a unique 
opoortunity to explore  the  accuracy of survey information on weekly 
benefit  levels,  weeks  of benefit receipt,  end  unemployment spell 
durations,  The date set allows us to compare accurate administrative 
records with the survey responses of the UI recipients.  We find that 
the sample members provide quite accurate information on the level of 
UI benefits  they received and quite poor  information on the weeks of 
benefits  received and the dates of the beginning and ending of their 
unemployment  spells.  67.5 percent of the 1408 individuals in our 
sample that provided  information on the level of weekly benefits 
reported exactly  (to the dollar) the benefit level indicated by 15 
administrative  records.  85 percent of the sample were within $10 of 
the true amount.  The mean self—report was slightly downward  biased 
($102 reported vs.  $105 actual) and the variance of the reporting 
error divided  by the variance  of the true value was a fairly small 
.26. 
On the other hand, very few individuals in the sample reported 
weeks of benefit receipt the same as indicated by their CWBH records. 
Only  15 percent of the 561 individuals in Missouri with a single 
spell of unemployment in the benefit year reported weeks of benefit 
receipt equivalent to the number provided by administrative  records, 
35 percent have deviations  from CWBH records of over 4 weeks)6  The 
mean absolute difference between weeks reported by respondents  and 
CWBH records is 4.5 weeks.  Many inconsistencies in reported dates 
are apparent  in the sample (e.g. reported end date of pre-Ul job 
after UI claim date or UI first payment date available  from 
administrative  records).  It appears that people may remember salient 
dollar amounts far better than the timing of events such as the start 
and end dates of unemployment spells. 
III. Recall Expectations and Unemployment Outcomes:  Some Evidence 
In this  section, we analyze the fraction of the unemployment  of 
UI recipients in Missouri and Pennsylvania that can be accounted  for 
16Consistent comparisons of self—reported weeks and 
administrative  records can only be done for individuals from Missouri 
with a single spell of unemployment.  Administrative  records on weeks 
of benefit  receipt are not available for Pennsylvania.  Individuals 
with  multiple  spells from Missouri  may include weeks of benefit 
receipt in latter spells outside the benefit year covered in our CWBH 
data set. 16 
by ex-ante and ax-post layoffs, the relation between recall 
expectations and job search behavior, and the importance of taking 
into account the possibility of recall when analyzing  the 
determinants of unemployment spell durations 
Reca11ptatlons,  Job  Search and theCposijonofUnipygnt 
The usual method of assessing the contribution of temporary 
layoffs to unemployment uses an ax-post concept of temporary  layoffs 
(Feldstein, 1975; Lilian,  1980)  Ex—post temporary layoffs are 
unemployment  spells that end through rehire to the original  employer. 
This concept is appropriate  if one Is interested in the amount of 
unemployment that does not  involve a change in employers. 
This concept is not the correct one for assessing  the 
contribution  of the temporary layoff process to total unemployment, 
The ax—post approach does not take into account the fact that some 
workers who expect to be recalled at the tire of layoff are not 
recalled or find other jobs before being recalled. Workers expecting 
recall whose expectations are not met, may have quite long 
unemployment  spells since they are unlikely to search intensively  for 
a new job as long as they regard the probability of recall to a 
valuable  old job as high.  If these workers receive UI benefits,  they 
may be willing to wait as long as the benefits  last before searching 
for another job.  Imperfectly experience—rated  firms may have an 
incentive to encourage workers in whom  they have  invested to wait for 
recall.  Other employers may be unwilling to incur the initial fixed 
costs of hiring and training workers with reasonable prospects  of 17 
recall to a  more attractive job.  These factors suggest an ex— ante 
temporary  layoff concept as the proper measure of the amount of 
unemployment affected by the layoff-recall process.  We define ex-ante 
temporary  layoff unemployment as the unemployment arising in spells 
in which  the individual expected to be recalled at the time of 
layoff.  The recall expectations information in our Missouri— 
Pennsylvania  data set allows us to compare this unemployment concept 
with the usual ax-post temporary layoff approach. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of first unemployment spells 
and weeks of first spell unemployment by spell outcome,  recall 
expectations,  and definite recall status for our entire sample using 
the ItJSR unemployment concept.  Since it is unlikely  that many of the 
long censored  spells ended in recall, it appears reasonable to 
conclude  that about 57 percent of the unemployment spells and 32 
percent of the weeks of unemployment of UI recipients in our two 
states are accounted for by ax-post temporary  layoffs.17  The typical 
spell ending in recall was substantially shorter than those ending  in 
the  finding of a new job.  Less than 10 percent of unemployment  is 
accounted  for by spells in which individuals had a definite  recall 
date.  On the other hand, almost 64 percent of unemployment is 
accounted  for by ex-ante temporary layoffs. Table 3 yields 
qualitatively  similar findings for Missouri alone using the PAYSPELL 
unemployment  Spell measure which more fully uses available 
17  The share of unemployment accounted  for by temporary layoffs 
is likely to be overstated in this sample relative to a random sample 
of unemployment  spells over the calendar year since most of the 
spells started in the peak period for temporary seasonal  layoffs 
(December,  .January, and February). 18 
administrative  information than the ITJSR measure. 
Table 4 provides more detailed  information on the relation 
between recall expectations and unemployment outcomes,  72 percent of 
those who expected to be recalled and 13 percent of those who did not 
expect to be recalled had spells actually ending in recall.  An 
interesting finding from this table is that flgpgthe  vast 
flanfiftsercent of the total une  of hx  ected  to 
he recall ad is accounted for  by  the minq  owgqu4_ecal  led. 
UI recipients who  cx ante expected to be recalled and  ax post were 
not recalled  tend  to have  quite long unemployment spells. While  this 
group accounts  for only 21 percent of the entire sample, it accounts 
for approximately  34 percent of first spell unemployment.  Since many 
of the  individuals of this group had spells censored at the  interview 
date, 34 percent may be an underestimate.18 
One plausible  reason why those who expect be recalled but are not 
tend to have long unemployment spells is that they may rationelly 
decide to wait for recall and not search very intensively  for a new 
job.  (They may also have a difficult  time gaining new jobs since 
employers will be reluctant to hire those likely to return to their 
old jobs.)  Table 5 provides  some information on the search behavior 
of the UI recipients  in our sample.  59 percent of the UI recipients 
claimed to have looked for work  at the time they were laid of  f. The 
average searcher spent 12 hours a  week looking for work. Those  that 
180n the other hand, many of the censored spells may involve 
individuals who have dropped out of the labor force. 19 
expected to be recalled were  substantially  less likely to search than 
those who did not expect to be recalled and they searched many  fewer 
hours on average as well.  This result is consistent with  the finding 
of Barron and Mellow (1979)  that those who classify  themselves as 
being on "temporary layoff" in the Current Population  Survey spend 
less time searching than do other individuals who classify themselves 
as unemployed.  Low search intensity may play a role in the low rate 
of new job finding of those who expect to be recalled. 
One may be interested in the distribution of total weeks of 
unemployment  in a  benefit year rather than  just first spell 
unemployment.  If some groups have proportionally more  unemployment 
in second and third spells, examining only the first spell would give 
a distorted  picture of the distribution of unemployment.  This bias 
would occur if past  unemployment was either an inoculation against 
future unemployment or a cause for greater difficulty  in finding and 
keeping a job.  While the data set does not allow the construction  of 
a good measure of total unemployment weeks in the benefit year, it 
does provide  information on total weeks of compensated unemployment 
(Weeks of UI benefit receipt)  for the Missouri  sample.  This measure 
is also directly  relevant for evaluating the fraction  of UI benefits 
accruing to individuals involved in temporary  layoffs. 
The distribution of total compensated unemployment  in the benefit 
year by outcome of the first spell and first spell recall 
expectations  is presented in Table 6.  Individuals whose first spell 
ended in recall account for almost 41 percent  of the total weeks of 
compensated unemployment.  This percentage  is substantially larger 20 
than their share of total weeks of first spell unemployment.  This 
difference  arises because those recalled are more likely to have 
multiple  spells of UI receipt in a year  and because  weeks of 
unemployment  after UI exhaustion are not included.  A  reasonable 
conclusion  from this table is that a large fraction  (maybe 40 percent 
or more) of the weeks of compensated unemployment  in Missouri  in this 
period were accounted  for by ax-post temporary  layoff Spells.  This 
finding is quite similar to that of Robertson  (1988)  for Canada. 
Robertson  finds that 44 percent of total UI weeks  in Canada  in 1984 
were accounted  for by ex-post temporary layoffs.  Thus, a substantial 
proportion  of insured unemployment in both the U.S. and canada 
appears to be related to the layoff—recall process. 
mentEarnins 
An important element in the evaluation of the success of a UI 
program is the effect of UI on the wages of reemployed workers. 
Table 7 provides  information on the post—UI job earnings  relative to 
pre-Ul job earnings of those individuals in the Missouri-Pennsylvania 
sample reemployed by the interview date.19  Those with unemployment 
spells ending in recall appear to go back to their old jobs since 
their post-UI hourly earnings are quite similar to their pre-Ul 
19Pre—UI earnings  are from information provided  by respondents 
at the time that they made their UI claims.  Post-UI earnings  are 
from the follow-up survey.  The choice of deflator  (Average Hourly 
Earnings  vs.  CPI) affects conclusions about the magnitude  of earnings 
changes.  The earnings  losses are substantially  larger when the CPI 
is used as the deflator.  On the other hand, the choice of deflator 
does not substantively  affect any conclusions concerning relative 
earnings changes of any of the groups compared. 21 
hourly earnings. On the other hand, the usual weekly hours of those 
rehired by their previous employers do decline by about 4.5 percent 
on average.  The reduced hours of those recalled  suggest may relate 
to the cyclical downturn that gained force by the middle of 1980. 
Individuals with spells ending through the finding of new jobs 
typically  experienced substantial earnings  declines.  In particular, 
the hourly earnings of those who expected to be recalled  but were  not 
fell by 15 percent on average, while new job finders who did not 
expect to be recalled  experienced 11 percent earnings  losses on 
average.  Table 7 also illustrates that individuals who exhausted 
their benefits experienced the largest earnings declines  by a 
substantial margin.  Their hourly earnings declined  by 30 percent on 
average and their weekly earnings declined even further.  The large 
losses of exhaustees suggest that reservation wages are likely to 
fall substantially  and that the new job finding rate is likely to 
increase substantially as benefits run out.  An alternative 
explanation  for the low relative reemployment earnings  of those with 
long spells is heterogeneity  in reemployment prospects.  Workers with 
low job offer arrival rates are likely to have both low reservation 
wages and low escape rates from unemployment for many plausible wage 
offer distributions  (Mortensen, 1986). 
The Distribution of Unemoloyinent  Spell Durations 
The pattern of initial unemployment spell durations  in our 
Missouri sample of UI recipients using the PAYSPELL unemployment 
spell concept is illustrated in Table 8 and Figures 1 and 2.  We 22 
focus our duration  analysis on the Missouri sample since more 
information to construct accurete spell durations  is available  for 
thie sampie  than for Pennsylvania  Table  8  gives the  Kaplsn—Meiar 
anpirical hazards for the PAYSPELL data.  The  overall empirical 
has5rd for a  given  week is the fraction  of spells ongoing at the 
start of that week which  end during the woek°  The recall end  new 
job eopiricai hazards crc  analogously defined es the frsrtion  of 
spells onooing at tho start of the  week which  end  during the  week 
through  recall end  through the finding of e  new  job respectively. 
The totel hezard  hesiceily  trends downward except for a rice at  12 
end  If weeks  end e valley at around 32  weeks.  The overall hazard 
masks  the quite distinct patterns  in the recall  sod  new  job hazards. 
The recell hazard drops  sharply over  time except for spikes et 12  end 
16  weeks end becomes quite low after about 25 weeks.  The  new  job 
hazard  starts out quite low and increases on average until shout 28 
weeks21  These basic differences  in the recall and new job finding 
hazards are quite similar to those found for UI recipients  in a 
national  sample of household heads from the PSID analyzed  by Katz 
(1986).  The upward  sloping new job hazard provides  some support for 
the UI exhaustion effects emphasized by Mortensen  (1977) and the 
20More formally, the Kaplan—Meier empirical  hazard for week t 
(H),  is the number of failures during the week  (D&, 
divided by the 
sfle of the risk set at the beginning of the week. The size of the 
risk set at the beginning of week t (R),  is the number of people 
whose spells hawe not ended or been oerisored  at the beginning  of week 
t. Thus, Ht 
= Dt/Rt. 
pronounced  even—odd effect, where the hazard tends to be  - 
higher in even weeks, is also evident in Figures  1 and 2.  A possible 
explanation  for this anomaly is that the cards used to claim benefits 
in Missouri.  are nailed two at a time to potential  recipients. 23 
impact of changing recall expectations on job search behavior 
discussed by Katz.  Direct evidence on exhaustion  effects is somewhat 
masked in Figures 1 and 2 because of the fair amount of variation  in 
potential durations  contained in the Missouri  sample. 
Figures 3 and 4 provide a direct look at possible  effects of 
finite length UI benefits on spell durations.  The figures present 
time until exhaustion empiri'al hazards analogous to the usual 
Kaplan-Meier estimators. The time axis is tine until benefits  lapse 
rather than time since a spell began.  The data behind these plots 
are reported  in Table 9.  There is a large spike  in the hazard  at the 
week of benefits  exhaustion.22  This spike is apparent  for both  the 
new job and recall hazards.  The new job finding rate remains 
relatively high after exhaustion, while the recall rate becomes 
minuscule  after exhaustion.  This suggests that workers may stop 
waiting for recall and start taking new jobs as their benefits  run 
out.  In fact, when we look only at workers who  indicated when  their 
spells began that they expected to be recalled, the new job finding 
rate is extremely  low early in spells and there is a prolonged  sharp 
increase in the new job escape rate from four weeks before exhaustion 
through three weeks after exhaustion. 
The recall spike around exhaustion  in figure 4 provides  some 
support for the Mortensen  (1987) joint wealth maximizing  model of the 
layoff-recall process.  The model predicts many recalls occurring when 
22The spike in the hazard function at the week  of benefits 
exhaustion is not primarily  a phenomenon related to hiring halls and 
seasonal  fluctuations in the construction industry.  Only 4 of the 26 
individuals with spells ending in the UI exhaustion week  were 
construction workers. 24 
the flaw velue af being unemplayed drape discretely es benefits  run 
nut.  In this case, recalls may make sense even if demand has nat 
recovered.  Additianally,  a ratating system af layoffs and recalls 
aay make  sense when benefits  are af limited duratian, 
The exhauetian  spikea  suppart the findings an a  PSID  sample af 
Katz  (1986)  and an a  CWBH  sample  by Maffitt  (1985)  and  Meyer  (1988). 
Katz  misc  found  that spikes in the  hazard near likely axhaustian 
points  (26  ond  29  weeks)  were  nat apparent  far non-UI  recipients  The 
absence of similar spikes for  non-UI  recipients provides strong 
support for the view that the  exhaustion  spikes for UI recipients are 
strongly  related to the finite length of UI benefits 
IV,  Formal  Duration Models_for the Mis  anon  Sasle of Ul,pqjpiefltq 
In this section,  we analyze the impact af recall expectatians, 
indiwidual and  pre—Ul  jab characteristics,  and  UI system variables an 
the total,  recall,  and  new  job exit rates  fram unemplayment  for the 
Misaouri  sample af UI recipienta. 
Modejppification 
The  exit rates fram unemployment are analyzed  using farmal hazard 
madel techniques.  Hazard madele have several advantages  aver ather 
techniques for analyzing unemployment spell data;  Unemployment 
spells are positive  randam variables which  are often censared  (9,3 
percent are censored  in our sample).  Many important explanatory 
variables  (e.g.  weeks until benefits exhaustion, local labor market 
conditions, etc.) change values during an unemployment  spell.  The 25 
entire time path of time—varying  explanatory variables and the 
possible censoring  of the dependent variable  are easily incorporated 
in a hazard model. 
We use a proportional  hazards model estimator  that allows for 
time—varying  explanatory variables  and which nonparametrically 
estimates  the change  in the hazard over time.  This semiparametric 
approach  is analyzed  in detail in Meyer  (1986).  The estimates are 
the parameters of a continuous time hazard model and thus retain a 
clear interpretation.  Nonparametrically  estimating the change  in the 
hazard over time eliminates the need to impose a  potentially 
restrictive functional  form that has no theoretical justification. 
If an incorrect functional form were  assumed,  all of the parameter 
estimates from the model would be inconsistent.  This danger is 
avoided by nonparametricaily  estimating the baseline  hazard. 
Formally, we paran-teterize the overall hazard rate from 
unemployment for individual  i at time t, (t),  using the 
proportional hazards form. 
Let T1 be the length of individual i's unemployment spell.  Then 
=  lim÷  prob[t+h>T.￿t I  T.StJ 
h.O  h 
= 
where 
A(t)  is the baseline hazard at time t, which  is unknown, 
z(t) is a vector  of time dependent explanatory var  oles for 
individual i,  and 
is a vector  of parameters which is unknown. 26 
The probability  of a spell lasting until tel given that is has lasted 
until t is easily written as a function of the hazard: 
1t±l 
(1)  PLT a t+l  T  a t] =  exp  { 
—  A(u)du] 
it 
Assuming  that z1(t) is constant between t and t±l, equation  (I)  can 
be rewritten as 
(2)  P[T1 a t±l  T  a t) = exp  ( 
—  exp(z4(t)'fl  7(t)) 
where 
t+  1 
(3)  y(t) = ln{  H(u)du}. 
The log-likelihood  for a  scruple  of  N  individuals  can be written 
as a function of terms  such  as  (2)23: 
(4) I  = I'd1  ln[l—exp(—exp17(a1)tz1(k)  flj'  —rxp yt)z(t,31} 
where k 
= the time a spell ends or is censored,  and 
d1  = I if the spell ends before the  survey  date  and 
0  if  the  spell  is  censored. 
This  approach assumes that censoring does  not provide any  information 
about  T4 beyond that available in the coveriates. 
We utilize an analogous methodology to estimate  the recall and 
new job hazards within a competing risks model  framework, The recall 
and new job hazards are specified analogously to the total hazard 
above,  In the estimation of the recall hazard, spells ending in the 
finding of a new job are treated as censored  (d 
= 0)  at the date  of 
new job finding.  Spells ending in recall are analogously  treated as 
23See Meyer  (1986) for a discussion of the derivation  of the 
likelihood  function and the properties of this estimator. 27 
censored  at the recall date in the estimation of the new job hazard. 
The effects of unemployment insurance on the hazard rates are 
measured using functions of the benefits  level and the time  until 
benefits  lapse.  The level of weekly UI benefits  is included as a 
time varying covariate whose impact is allowed to vary depending  on 
whether the individual is still receiving benefits or has exhausted 
benefits.  Also included are time until benefit exhaustion dummy 
variables  for five intervals covering both weeks before and after 
benefits  have expired.  These variables are designated UI 6—10 
through UI a-i.  Each of these time-varying exhaustion dummies takes 
on the value of 1 in its designated  interval and takes on the value 
of 0 in all other periods.  For example, UI 6—10 takes on the value 1 
when the individual is 6 to 10 weekS until exhaustion, UI  0 takes on 
the value of 1 in the week of benefits exhaustion, and UI a-I takes 
on the value of 1 when the individual S  one  week or more after 
exhaustion.  Those 11 or more weeks before exhaustion are the 
comparison group, the group corresponding  to the omitted dummy 
variable. 
Results for the Missouri  ui Recipient smpj 
Semiparametric  hazard model estimates of the total, recall and 
new job hazards for the Missouri  sample using the PAISPELL 
unemployment  spell variable  are presented  in Table 10.24  Initial 
recall expectations have a strong effect on the hazards,  raising the 
24The sample size falls to 756 in the hazard model estimates 
since 52 individuals in the original Missouri  sample have missing 
pre-Ul job.tenure data. 28 
recall and reducing the new job hazarda aubstantially.  Using the 
estimates in Table 10,  those expecting recall have a recall hazard 
that is almost ten times as high as those who do not expect to be 
recalled.  Furthermore, those expecting recall have a new job hazard 
vhich is almost forty percent lower.  The large negative coefficient 
on expect recall in the new job hazard indicates that workers who 
expect to he recalled and are not, tend  to have much longer 
uneoplovtent spells than observationelly  equivalent workers who 
realized they were permanently diaplaced at the time of layoff.  This 
result is consistent with the  finding of Pets  (1986) that individuals 
with unemployment spells in)tiated by plant closings  have higher new 
job finding rates than those with unemployment spells initiated by 
lsyoffs,  Tho expect recall and definite recall variables  also have 
strong effects on the total hazard in the estimates presented  in 
Table 10,  Those that have s definite  recall date  (end necessarily 
expect recall) have a total hazard which  is over twice as high as 
those,  not expecting recell,  A  definite  recall date also increases 
further the recall hazard by a factor of 1.7, but has no significant 
2R  effect on the new job hazard. 
Increases  in pre—Ul job tenure, a possible measure of firm 
25The industry dummy variable  coefficients are fairly smell and  statistically  insignificant when expect recall and definite recall  date are included in the hazard model estimates,  The recall rate is 
substantially higher in nondurable goods and the new job finding rate  is substantially  lower in durable goods than in other industries  in  the specifications presented  in Table  10.  When  the expect recall end  definite  recall date dummies are excluded,  the industry dummy  variables have much larger end statistically significant effects with  construction,  durable goods, and nondurable goods industries having  significantly higher recall rates and significantly  lower new job  finding rates than other industries. 29 
specific human capital or job match quality, is associated with a 
significantly  increased recall hazard and decreased  new job hazard. 
Older workers  appear to have longer spells because of both lower 
recall and new job finding rates after controlling for tenure.  The 
total hazard estimates mask  many  large differences between the 
effects of the covariates o'i the  recall and new job finding hazards. 
The large and significant  increases in the recall and new job 
hazards apparent  in Figure 4 at the week of benefits  exhaustion  are 
strongly  confirmed  in the more sophisticated hazard  model estimates. 
Higher UI benefits  are associated with higher recall rates and lower 
new job finding rates.  The UI benefit coefficients  in the new job 
hazard appear reasonable; higher benefits greatly depress the new job 
finding rate, and this effect disappears after benefits are 
exhausted.  The positive  and significant coefficient  in the recall 
hazard is a puzzle.  High UI benefits may be linked to the short-term 
temporary  layoff sector of the Missouri  economy.  The effect of UI 
and the pre-Ul wage on the total hazard are of opposite  sign from the 
findings  of most studies, although they are not statistically 
significant.  The odd UI benefit coefficient  estimates may arise 
because the variation  in benefits  in Missouri  has a peculiar  form: 
over 71 percent of the sample received either exactly $105 or exactly 
$85 in benefits.  Variation  in benefits  across states and points  in 
time  is usually available  in studies finding that UI benefits 
increase unemployment  spell durations  (e.g.  Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 
1976; Meyer,  1988). 
We further examine the time pattern of the baseline hazards  from 30 
these rodels  flow  that we have controlled for observable differenoes 
rross individuals.  After xncludxng explanatory '-'enables,  the time 
pattern  of the hazcjrds  Is captured by the 5!aj  'a,  the beseline  hazard 
parameters  defined in equation  (3).  These parameters confirm the 
patterns sear in Figures  1  and  2.  A  total hazard which  falls with 
unempoyoent duratron masks  the conn>ictr - of an  upward  sloping new 
job hazard  ann  a  downward  oping  cC.' al  hazard.  t test of thece 
patterns whsc  conforms  the -'iaue  spressi's  see perfo-ned osing  GUI 
repr'salon or the asaline bzzorn  concoct  eta c the 'ençth  of spoil 
As  a  aonn:y of the data,  s'e teal tor spacoficatoan 
/  t)  —  a  t  Ic (c  ThIs spec 13 cation  rougo:y 000reerrr?z to o 
iieibull baseline canard.  These regressions yield a positive 
coefficient or  ln (t)  for the  new  job hazard,  and  a  negative 
cocificient  or-  ln(t) for the total hazard and the recall hazard, all 
of whir-n  are nnniflcant  at the  5  percent level,  These results 
clecrly snow t-r - aThe  of the oorceting rirkn specification whioor 
silo cc  rTh  disentangling of the  two affects which  produce the total 
hazard,  Furtherncre, the  finding that the  new  job escape  rate rises 
with  spell duration,  even after controlling  for the remaining 
potential  duration  of III benefits,  suggests that  falling reservation 
wages  from dcc:  ining assets and changing recall expectations  may play 
an important role in the reemployment process of laid—off workara/6 
6Although uncontrolled  heterogeneity  biases estimates  of the 
overall hazard towards spurious findings  of negative  duration 
dependence,  a bias in the opposite  direction  is possible  for an 
individual escape route hazard  in a competing risks  framework.  If 
uncontrolled  factors that raise the recall hazard also  lower the new 
job hazard, then one can in theory find spurious positive  duration 
dependence  in the new job hazard.  Han and Hausman  (1986)  have 31 
A potentiai problem with the estimates  in Table 10 is that it is 
likely that sose individual attributes which affect the hazard zate 
are omitted from the list of covariates.  If unobserved heterogenesty 
is present,  but not allowed for in the estimation, the coefficient 
estimates  will be biased  (Lancaster 1979, 1985).  Table 11 reports 
estimates which allow for individuat specific omitted attrlbutea 
under the sssunptlon that a garna distnibotion  Is a reasonable 
approxlmatlln  to the dIstrsotIon of hetaroenelty In the 
population. 
27  The estimates  an tab1 a  ii  ore very  similar to tb ss in 
Table  10 except  or the rescoiinp effect suggested  by  fancasCer 
(1935)  .  Lancaller finds boat the ooission of heterogenezty  biases 
parameter saflnates  tow rds zero,  even though elsaticities of  moan 
duration witn  respect to covariates  may  not change. 
Specifications  acre also tried which  Included  several additional 
covariaes  cLoxvy  zariable sat equai  to  £  if the individual  engaped 
in oo searn at the tica of ob iosa,  the time-varying state 
unemployment rate,  and  five  occupation  dummy  variables,  None  of 
these additono noticeably chenged the key  findings.  The state 
developed an estimator to handle  correlated,  unobserved heterogeneity  in  a competing  risks model.  They  implement their estimator  on the 
PSID layoff unemployment spell data sat developed by Katz  (1986)  and 
find essentially  zero correlation among the unobserved heterogeneity 
factors in the  new job and recall  hazards. 
27Whether  or not the gamma distribution is sufficiently flexible 
is a subject of debate.  Hecknan and Singer (1984) argue that  it is 
not, but their results come from am example where a fairly 
restrictive  parametric form for the baseline  nazard is assumed. 
Ridder and 'Jerbakal  (1983) offer some evidence  that the gamma 
distribution  does fairly well.  Some pralzminary Monte Carlo 
experiments  by one of the current authors indicates that coefficient 
estimates  are relatively insensitive to the distribution of 
heterogeneity  when the baseline  hazard is estimated nonparametrically. 32 
unemployment  rate and occupation dummies were always insignificant. 
The behavior  of the search variable  again illustrates the usefulness 
of the competing  risks approach.  In the total hazard the search 
variable comes in negative and highly significant, implying that 
those who search initially are reemployed less quickly,  However, 
this may arise because initial search acts as a further proxy  for the 
likelihood of recall.  Those who strongly expect to be recalled  may 
not search and may also be recalled quickly.  The recall and new job 
hazard estimates provide some support for this interpretation.  The 
search variable has a large negative value in the recall hazard, but 
is small and insignificant  in the new job hazard. 
Overall,  the lack of variation in the UI parameters within 
Missouri  suggests the need to look at a date set covering  more states 
and a longer time period to more accurately determine the impect of 
the length and level of UI benefits on spell durations,28  The 
results with  the Missouri sample do indicate that the recall process 
plays a major part in determining the duration of unemployment  spells 
of UI recipients and the increase in unemployment escape rate  around 
when benefits  lapse, 
We also examined hazard model estimates  for the Pennsylvania 
subsample, though we were less confident about the accuracy  of the 
spell lengths since their derivation relied more  heavily on survey 
responses  rather than administrative  records,  The benefit level and 
28We are currently neginning an analysis of a large data set 
that is better  suited to the estimation of UI effects.  The data set 
covers 9 states over a six year period and includes most of the 
variables  available in the Missouri—Pennsylvania  data set plus other 
information. 33 
pre—TJI  wage  coefficients  in  the  total  hazard  had  the  signs  found 
previous  studies  (e.g.  Classen,  1979), but they were not 
significantly  dcfferent  fros zero.  The signs and significanre of the 
expect recall and dennita recafl date  jsriablea were very cicilar tu 
those found for Missouri.  The definite recall oats csefficients 
tended to be larger than fur Missouri,  Thin is nor surprising give; 
tne greeter use.  af uefinit,. rea21 Yates in Pannsyiiania as seen in 
Tsule I.  tefi ,ate recaY hal me expecred  nsgatc:e aign in the ncv 
jso nazaru ,nh tte effects of tenure an ths preYaous  job sets san:1o 
In tna tvo at,ts, 
virally, several authara,  including  fascnrcoh  1177)  nave 
suggestac a ubte rcasrn sny cradles wn  ah use  weeks ccnpenrateo  by 
UI as the  tecendent  variabe rjght yield tlnsed benefit coefficients 
They suggcst nat higher nanef its sight  anduce  people to clan 
ours prsaptly,  so  met  nrger traction 51  en unemployment spell of 
a given  lantth wuall Sn  span" receizing "1.  TPis affect night lead 
to the f'ndrg that righer bencf its ,ase lunger  cospensated  spells 
even wean there  is no sliest on  the total length of unesploymant 
This  effect Is of potential  isportance in our Missouri  sample share 
the nean nurber of weeks from loss of 3ob till UI scala is 3.6 weeks 
and the standard  deviation is 4.3  weeks.  This hypothesis was teted 
by estimating hazard nodeis where the dependent variable  is the time 
from lOSS of job to the UI clam  date.  We used a set of control 
variables  like that used for the unemployment spell specifications. 
The Mamermesh  hypothesis would require a large positive coefficient 
on the benefit level, but the estimated coefficient was close to 34 
zero, negative  and insignificant.  This result provides  some support 
for the reliability of studies which use weeks compensated as the 
dependent variable.29 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the extent to which the unemployment of 
UI recipients  in the U.S. can be attributed to alternative  concepts 
of temporary  layoffs and the impact of the potential  duration of UI 
benefits  on the distribution of unemplonent spell durations of UI 
racipiants. 
We find that an understanding of the layoff-rehire process  is 
critical to understanding  the composition of unemployment 
(particularly insured unemployment)  in the United States,  Over 30 
percent of the total weeks of unemployment of UI recipients  in 
Missouri and Pennsylvania were attributable to unemployment  spells 
ending in recall,  Tx-ante temporary layoffs  (those in which  the 
individual initially expected to be recalled) may account for over 60 
percent of the unemployment of UI recipients.  Individuals who 
initially expect to be recalled search less intensely for new jobs 
than other UI recipients and tend to have extremely  long unemployment 
spells if they are not actually rehired by their original  employer. 
The recall rate is quite high  at short spell durations  and right 
around the point at which UI benefits lapse. 
The potential duratict  of UI benefits appears to have a 
29Solon (1981) found a similar result in am examination  of CWBH 
data for 3 states during the 1978—79 period. 35 
substantial  impact on the length of the .anamployment  spells of U.S. 
UI recipients.  Our findings indicate that the probability  of leaving 
unemployment  (both through recalls and new job finding) increases 
greatly around tha time that benefits are exhausted.  Furthermore, 
some rough sioulationa based on hazard model  estimates for taelve 
states in Katz and Meyer  (1988)  indicate that an increase in the 
potential duration  of benefits  of tne size that naturally  occurs when 
a state passes through an extended benefIts  trIgger increases the 
mean weeks of corpensated  oneoployrent in a benefit year by 15 
percent  (2.6 weeks1.  This  is a large effect given that most spells 
are corpleted well before regular benefits  run out,  In fact, the 
impact of the extended  benefits trigger on the duration  of UI 
recipient unemployment  spells ix estimated  to be almost identical to 
the io'pact of a uniform  2')  percent increase  in the level of benefits. 
Alterstively,  Moffitt and Nicholaon  '1982,  using a labor supply 
estimatIon  framework find that a one—week Increase  in the potential 
duration  of benefits  increases the length of an average spell by 0.1 
week. 
These findings cuggeats that a further examination of the impact 
of the potential  length of UI benefits on onemployment could be quite 
useful.  Most  work  on the effects of UI focuses on differences  in 
replacement  rates or experience rating provisions,  Rules concerning 
potential benefit durations very greatly across OECD countries with 
the typical potential  duration  ranging from 26 weeks in the United 
States, to two end a half years in Denmerk, and to a virtually 
unlimited  duration  in Belgium  (Emerson, 1988).  Shorter maximum 36 
durations  of UI and the much  greater importance of the layoff-recall 
process  may play a major role in the lower incidence of extremely 
long—term unemployment  in the U.S. and Canada than in most European 
countries. 37 
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LaoorEcononcs 7  (1985):  pm.  9l—135 Table 1:  Descriptive  Statistics  for UI Recipients'  Data Set 
Missouri  and Pennsylvania 
Unemployment  Spell  Start Dates  in 1979-80 
Mean (SD.) 
-  Descriotion  MO  PA 
IUSR  weeks from  UI claim  date  until  16.64 
reemployment  or  until  interview  (15.62) 
date if  spell  is censored 
FSPELL  weeks from  end of pre-Ul  job until  19.35 
reemployment  or  until  interview  (16.66) 
data if  spell  is censored 
PAYSPELL  weeks from  UI first payment date  15.27 
until  reemployment  or  until  (14.81) 
interview  date f  spell is 
censored  (Missouri  only) 
PD1  potential  benefits  duration in  22.92 
weeks at claim  date  (4.52) 
Var  ohi a 
12.91  14.92 
(14.47)  (15.15) 
16.21  17.90 
(16.54)  (16.67) 
UI benefit  augmented  weekly  benefit  amount 

















































— I if expect  recall at time 
of claim 
— 1  if have definite  recall date 
— 1 if  spell  ended  in  recall 
— I if  spell  ended  in taking 
a new job 
— 1  if  spell  is censored  at 
interview  date 
age in  years 
— 1  if  female 
— 1  if  married 
years  of schooling 
— I if  spouse  works 
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Table 1: continued 
Mean (SD) 
MO  PS  Tn1 
I if  professional,  technical, 
or managerial 
I if clerical  or sales 
1 if supervisor 
1 if craft  and related 
occupations 
1 if operator 
1 if  laborer 
Sample  size  808  691  1499 
I if mining 
1 if constrction 
2 if  durable  goods  manufacturttg 
I if nondurable  goods 
manufacturing 
L if transportation. 
communications  or utilities 
I  if wholesale  or retail  trade 
1 if public  administration 
1 if services 
Industry Dummies 
Mining 
Construct  — 
Durablas  — 
Nondurables 
Transport 
Trade  — 






Craft  — 
Operator  — 
Laborer 
01  03  02 
30  .28  29 
21  .24  22 
16  .17  .16 
.06  .04  .05 
12  .13  .22 
03  03  .03 
11  .08  .10 
.06  .05  .05 
.10  .09  .10 
06  .04  .05 
.34  .38  .36 
.23  .29  .26 
.21  .15  l8 Table  2: Characteristics  of First  Spells of Unemployment 
Entire  Sample:  Missouri  and Pennsylvania 
Unemployment  Measure  — IUSR 
n—1499 
Percentage  of  Mean 
Percentage  Total  Weeks  of  Duration 
Lie1ls  Unemolovment  in Weeks 
Scell  Outcome 
Recall  57.2  32.4  8.4 
New Job  34.4  39.1  17.0 
Censored  8.4  28.5  50.6 
Recall  Exectations 
Expect  Recall  75.2  63.8  12.7 
Don't  Expect  24.8  36.2  21.8 
Recall 
Definite  Recall 
Definite  Recall  Date  18.1  9.7  8.0 
No Definite  Recall  81.9  90.3  16.5 
Date 
The length  of  the unemployment  spell up to the interview  date is utilized  as 
the unemployment  spell duration  for censored  spells  in the percentage  of 
unemployment  and mean duration  in  weeks  calculations. Table  3:  Characteristica  of First  Spells of Unemployment 
Missouri  0niy 
Unemployment  Measure  — PAYSPELL 
n80  8 
Percentage  of  Mean 
Percentage  Total  Weeks  of  Duration  nemloentieeks 
Recall  30.2  9  j 
New  Job  39 6  39.7  15.3 
Censored  9,3  30.1  49 6 
Exectatos 
Expect  Recall  74.4  65.7  13.5 
Dont  Expect  25.6  34.3  20.4 
Recall 
iteRecai 
Definite  Recall  Date  12.0  7.1  9.1 
No Definite  Recall  88.0  92.9  16.1 
Date 
The length  of the unemployment  spell up to the interview  date is utilized  as 
the unemployment  spell  duration  for censored  spells in  the percentage  of 
unemployment  and mean  duration  in weeks  calculations. Table 4: Recall  Expectations  and Unemployment  Outcomes 
Entire  Sample: Missouri  and Pennsylvania 
Unemployment  Measure  IUSR 
nl49  9 
Percentage  of  Mean 
Percentage  Total  Weeks  of  Duration 
f  Spells 
lOutcome 
Recall  71.7  46,4  8.2 
New  Job  22.2  29.0  16.5 
Censored  6.1  24.6  50.8 
nll27 
Don t ExDect  Ret  all 
Percentage  of  Mean 
Percentage  Total  Weeks  of  Duration 
of Soells  Unemo1oynent  in Weeks 
Stell  Outcome 
Recall  13.4  7.6  12.3 
New Job  71.2  57.0  17.4 
Censored  15.3  35.4  50.4 
n—37  2 Table  5:  Search Behavior  of UI Recipients 
Entire  Sample: Missouri  and Pennsylvania 
n—149  9 
Mean Search  Unconditional 
Percent  Hours  Per Week  Mean Search 
Who Searched  of Those  Who  Hours  Per 
Searched  Week 
Entire  Sample  59  12.1  7.1 
Outcome 
Recall  41  9.8  4.0 
New Job  85  14.3  12.1 
Censored  78  11.3  8.8 
ecraciona 
Expect  Recall  52  10.9  5.7 
Don't  Expect  Recall  83  14.5  12.0 
Definite  Recall 
Definite  Recall  33  11.7  3.8 
Date 
No Definite  Recall  65  12 2  7  9 
Date 
The percent  who searched  calculations  are based on the yes-no  answers  of 
workers to the following  question:  "I'd  like  to ask you about  the period  of 
time after  that  job  [pre-Ul job[ ended.  Did you look  for work  at that time?" 
Workers  who answered  yes to this  question  were later  asked  "And  about  how many 
hours per week on  the average would  you say you spent  looking  for work?" Table  6: Distribution  of  Total  Compensated  Unemployment 
in  Benefit Year 
Missouri  Only 
n8O8 
Mean  Weeks of  % of Total 
Percentage  of  Compensated  Compensated 
Indivtduals pemploym.en  Unemp1pymen 
Outcome  of 
First  Spell 
Recall  51.1  11.3  40.7 
New Job  39.6  15.3  42.9 
Censored  9.3  25.1  16.4 
First  Spell 
Recall  Expectations 
Expect  Recall  74.4  13.2  69.5 
Don't  Expect  25.6  16.9  30.5 
Recall 
Entire  Samtle 
Mean Weeks  of Compensated  Unemployment  — 14.2 
S.D. of Weeks of Compensated  Unemployment  — 9.9 Table  7  Post-UI Job Earnings  Relative  to Pre-Ul Job Earnlgs 
for  those Reemployed  by the Inteiiew  Date 
Earnings  Change Measure  — Log(Post-UI  Earnings  / Pre-Ul Earntngs) 
Missouri  and Pennsylvania 
Entire Sarple 
Change  in Log  Change  in Log 
Weekly  Earnings  Hourly  Earnings 
S  ar"p  I  e 
Size  Mean  Me(an  Mean  Medan 
0utcre 
Recall  838  -  059  - .046  -  014  -  023 
(.011)  (.009) 
New Joo  93  -  156  -  103  -  128 
023)  (.019) 
New Job  Finders 
Change in Log  Change  in  Log 
Weekly  Earnings  Hourly  Earnings 
Sample 
Size  Mean  MedIan  Mean  Median 
Recall Expectations 
Expect Recall  240  - .201  - .141  - .151  - .104 
(.034)  (.028) 
Don't  Expect  253  - .113  - .081  - .106  - .081 
Recall  (.031)  (.027) 
Whether  Exhausted 
Exhausted  67  - .520  - .425 
- .301  - .246 
Benefits  (.078)  (.058) 
Didn't  Exhaust  426  - .098  - .086  - .101  - .085 
Benefits  (.023)  (.020) 
The nwnbers  In parentheses  are the standard  errors of tie means.  Earnings  are 
deflated  by average  hourly  earnings  of  U.S.  private nonagricultural  workers 
(series AHEEAP  from  DEl).  The base  period  for the deflator  is the second 
quarter  of 1979.  Pre-Ul  job earnings  are deflated  from the end date of the 
pre-Ul  job.  Post-UI  job earnings  are deflated from the interview  date. Table 8:  Empirical  Hazards for Missouri Sample 
Using PAYSPELL  Unemployment  Spell Concept 
Number of  Spells  That End  Empirical  Hazard 
Weeks  Risk 
Unemployed  Set  Total  Recall  New Job  Total  Recall  New Job 
1  756  75  59  16  0.0992  0.0780  0.0212 
2  681  48  36  12  0.0705  0.0529  0.0176 
3  633  46  27  19  0.0727  0.0427  0.0300 
4  587  36  23  13  0.0613  0.0392  0.0221 
5  551  24  15  9  0.0436  0.0272  0.0163 
6  527  35  23  12  0.0664  0,0436  0,0228 
7  492  29  14  15  0.0589  0.0285  0.0305 
8  463  40  24  16  0.0864  0.0518  0,0346 
9  423  16  12  4  0.0378  0.0284  0.0095 
10  407  32  14  18  0.0786  0.0344  0.0442 
11  375  19  9  10  0.0507  0.0240  0.0267 
12  356  45  28  17  0.1264  0.0787  0,0478 
13  311  20  12  8  0.0643  0.0386  0.0257 
14  291  16  11  5  0.0550  0.0378  0.0172 
15  275  22  14  8  0.0800  0.0509  0.0291 
16  253  27  16  11  0.1067  0.0632  0.0435 
17  226  12  6  6  0.0531  0.0265  0.0265 
18  214  15  8  7  0.0701  0.0374  0.0327 
19  199  9  4  5  0.0452  0.0201  0.0251 
20  190  14  6  8  0.0737  0.0316  0.0421 
21  176  3  1  2  0.0170  0.0057  0.0114 
22  173  12  2  10  0.0694  0.0116  0.0578 
23  161  7  3  4  0.0435  0.0186  0.0248 
24  154  11  6  5  0.0714  0.0390  0.0325 
25  143  5  1  4  0.0350  0.0070  0.0280 
26  138  8  3  5  0.0580  0.0217  0.0362 
27  130  4  0  4  0.0308  0.0000  0.0308 
28  126  5  3  2  0.0397  0.0238  0.0159 
29  121  4  1  3  0.0331  0.0083  0.0248 
30  117  2  0  2  0.0171  0.0000  0.0171 
31  114  1  0  1  0.0088  0.0000  0.0088 
32  113  1  0  1  0.0088  0.0000  0.0088 
33  112  2  0  2  0.0179  0.0000  0.0179 
34  110  3  0  3  0.0273  0.0000  0.0273 
35  107  5  2  3  0.0467  0.0187  0.0280 
36  102  4  1  3  0.0392  0.0098  0.0294 
37  98  6  1  5  0.0612  00l02  0.0510 
38  92  3  1  2  0.0326  0.0109  0.0217 
39  89  4  0  4  0.0449  0.0000  0,0449 
40  85  2  1  1  0.0235  0.0118  0.0118 Table 9: Empirlcal Time Until Exhaustion  Hazards for Missouri Sample 
Us.ng PAYSPELL  Unemployment Spell Concept 
ks  Until  Risk 
Exhaustion  Set  Sew Job 
25  415  00192 
24  404  0 0123 
23  -.03  00298 
22  404  00149 
21  410  007G 
20  427  00213 
19  425  30235 
18  -.'  00384 
17  442  0.0218 
15  -.1  0.0216 
15  422  00213 
14  431  00371 
13  0.0411 
12  409  0.0171 
11  408  0.0294 
10  398  0 0377 
9  374  0,0213 
8  350  0.0371 
7  320  00125 
6  304  0,3164 
5  291  0 0344 
4  268  0.0336 
3  254  0.0.97 
2  244  0.0328 
1  220  0.0500 
0  201  0.0746 
-l  164  0.0305 
-2  151  0.032 
-3  143  0.0140 
-4  137  0.0073 
-5  129  0.0310 
-6  115  0.0261 
-7  107  0.0280 
-8  98  0.0306 
-9  88  0 0000 
10  85  0.0118 
-11  72  0 0000 
-12  59  0.0000 
-13  54  0.0185 
-14  51  0.0392 
-15  47  0.0426 
-16  43  0.0233 
-17  40  0,0000 
-18  36  0.0278 
-19  34  0.0000 
-20  32  0.0625 
Number of Spells  That End  Empirical  Hazard 
Total  Recall  New Job  Total  Recall 
41  33  8  0.0987  0 0795 
39  25  5  0 0743  0.0618 
30  18  12  0.07-.4  0,0447 
26  24  6  0.0644  0.0435 
26  19  7  0.063  0.0463 
32  23  9  0 0758  0.0545 
25  15  19  0.0588  0,03t2 
34  18  46  02815  0.0432 
23  14  9  0.3558  9.0340 
21  12  9  0.0504  00288 
49  10  9  U 0450  0 0237 
40  24  16  0.0928  0.0557 
31  14  1'  0 0749  0.0338 
24  14  7  9.0513  00342 
25  13  12  0.0613  0.0319 
24  9  15  0.0603  0.0226 
21  13  8  0.0561  0.0348 
27  14  13  0,0771  0.0400 
8  4  4  0 0250  0.0125 
12  7  5  0.0395  0.0230 
13  3  10  0,0446  00103 
16  7  9  0.0597  0 0261 
11  6  5  0.0433  0.0236 
17  9  8  00697  0.0369 
17  6  11  0.0773  0.0273 
26  11  15  0.1294  0 0547 
1  2  5  0.0427  0.0122 
4  2  2  0 0265  0.0132 
4  2  2  0.0280  0.0140 
2  1  1  0.0146  0.0073 
4  0  4  0.0310  0.0000 
3  0  3  0.0261  0.0000 
4  1  3  0.0374  0 0093 
4  1  3  0.0408  0.0102 
0  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
1  0  1  0 0118  0.0000 
0  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
1  1  0  00169  00169 
1  0  1  0.0185  0.0000 
2  0  2  0.0392  0.0000 
2  0  2  0.0426  0.0000 
1  0  1  0.0233  0.0000 
0  0  0  0.0000  0.0000 
1.  0  1  0.0278  0.0000 
1  1  0  0.0294  0.0294 
2  0  2  0.0625  0.0000 Expect  Recall  .423 
(.099> 
Definite  Recall 
UI Benefit  ($lOO's),  PreExhaustb 
UI  Benefit  ($lOO's),  Post-Exhaust  .496 
(.838) 
Log Likelihood  Value 
Continued  on the next  page 
-2416.2  -1388.4 
Table  10: Semiparametric  Hazard  Model  Estimates8 
Missouri  UI Recipients  (n—756) 
Total  Recall  New Job 
Hazard  Hazard  Hazard 
Pre-VI  Net Weekly  Wage ($l00s) 
Age 
Age Squared  / 100 










2.236  -.500 
(.272)  (.135) 
.445  .509  .218 
(.138)  (.148)  (.282) 
.381  1.640  -1.115 
(.322)  (.438)  (.447) 
- .150 
(1 136) 
-.026  -.075  .048 
(.045)  (.059)  (.061) 
-.043  -.039  -.054 
(.024)  (.031)  (.040> 
.046  .041  .053 
(.029)  (.039)  (.050) 
.0139  .0260  - .0304 
(.0073)  (.0088)  (.0191) 
.032  - .049  .128 
(.018)  (.030)  (.029) 
- .404  - .392  .459 
(.193)  (.247)  (.288) 
- .161  .027  - .416 
(.118)  (.145)  (.182) 
.928  .835  .789 
(.235>  (.371)  (.329) 
.393  .385  .410 
(.300)  (.479)  (.405) 
-.090  -.045  -.164 
(.194)  (.273)  (.291) 
- .167  - .166  - .182 
(.146)  (.208)  (.220) 
- .636  - .470  -1.423 
(.732)  (.416)  (.976) 
-1275.6 Table  10 continued 
5The unemployment  spell duration measure utilized is PAYSFELL, Other controls 
included in each of  the specifications ate number  of  dependents, spouse works 
and marrIed  durorr:ss, a dummy inditsting whether  the spell started befote 
February 1  198)  industry dummies  weeks from  end of  pre-Ul  job  ntil claim 
dare, weeks  from claim date until first payment date.  In toe total and new 
job hazard models  individual oaselne harard parameters  are eatizatsd for 
Qeeks  I  to  52  spells  lorger than 52 weeks  are censored at 52.  In the recall 
hazard  parsxreeci are estimated  fun  the first  30  weeks  sf'er whIch spells ao 
censored  The  kuolbers  In parentheses ste asymptotic standard  errors 
°The  UI benefit level variable is constrained  to have  the  same  effect before 
and  after exhaustIon  in the recall hazard model. 
°The time until exhaustIon dummy varoabuos  are defined in the test Table 11: Semiparametric  Hazerd  Model Estimates 
Allowing Gamma Heterogeneitya 
Missouri  UI Recipients  (n756) 
Total  Recall  New Job 
Variable  Hazard  Hazard  Hazard 
Expect  Recall  .634  2.744  - .874 
.  (.171)  (.330)  (.253) 
Definite Recall  .523  .626  .193 










UI Benefit ($l00s)  Post-Exhaust  1.397  .395 
(1.058)  (1.522) 
Pre-UI  Net Weekly Wage ($100's)  - .045  - .107  .075 
(.064)  (.084)  (.100) 
Age 
- .072  - .066  - .003 
(.038)  (.045)  (.067) 
Age Squared / 100  .080  .076  .013 
.  (.046)  (.055)  (.082) 


















Female  - .173  .075  - .686 
Time  Until Exhaustion  Dummieac: 
(.181)  (.218)  (.311) 




































-2405.2  -1384.3  -1265.3 
heterogeneity  variance 
Log Likelihood  Value 
Continued  on the next  page Table  11 continued 
aThe unemployment spell duration measure utlLzed is PAYSPELL. Other controLs 
included in each  of the specifications ere number  of dependents,  spouse works 
and married dmirles. a dummy  indicating whether the spell started bafore 
Februsry  1  1980,  6 industry dummies, weeks from end of pre-Ul job ur'til dale 
date, weeks  from claim dste  onrl first payment date.  In the total and tee 
job hazard models  individ_al baseline hazard parameters  are estomated  for 
weeks  I to 
'  spells  longer than 12 weeks  ate censored at  52.  In me reds. 
hszscd  psrste  a  are  estinsted  for  the  fIrst  30  weeks,  after  which  spells  at— 
censored  The  nt.ooers  in  perenfieses are aoymptotio standard errors 
bm  UI  benefit laid  srIaoe  cc  constrained  to  have  the sane effect before 
end after eabsascion  In the recel'  Isrerk todd. 
'Tha  time  .snril  exhaustIon dummy  vacables  are defined  in  the text. h
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